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The New Cap on 
Non-Economic Damages 
and Health Claims 
Arbitration in 
Maryland-An Overview 
T he 1986 Maryland legislature passed a new law which arbitrarily caps or limits the right of catastrophically 
injured plaintiffs to be fully, fairly and 
adequately compensated. The law, which 
became effective on July 1, 1986, places a 
cap of $350,000.00 for all non-economic 
losses regardless of the extent of injuries 
and the circumstances of the specific case. I 
Accordingly, Maryland citizens who are 
injured at the hands of negligence on or 
after July 1, 1986, cannot under any cir-
cumstances, receive a judgment in excess 
of $350,000.00 for "non-economic dam-
ages" which include pain and suffering, 
physical impairment, disability, incon-
venience, disfigurement, and other non-
pecuniary damages. 2 
In addition to creating the cap, the new 
law requires the trier off act (whether it is a 
jury or a Health Claims Arbitration panel) 
to itemize damages for past medical ex-
penses, future medical expenses, past lost 
earnings, future lost earnings, non-eco-
nomic and other damages. Further, if the 
plaintiff dies prior to the payment of all 
future medical expenses awarded, the re-
maining portion of the award reverts to the 
insurance carrier or the defendant instead 
of going to the estate of the decedent. Fi-
nally, the court or the arbitration panel may 
also order any and all future economic 
damages to be paid by periodic payments 
(commonly referred to as an "annuity") in-
stead of a lump sum. 
As is apparent, the rights of seriously in-
jured plaintiffs have been compromised as 
a result of the liability "insurance crisis" 
which began over a year ago with artifi-
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cially skyrocketing premiums and arbi-
trary cancellation of various liability poli-
cies. 3 Municipalities, camps, skating rinks, 
bus companies, physicians, attorneys and 
many others experienced exorbitant pre-
mium increases or found that insurance 
was essentially "unavailable". Through 
public relations and advertising, the in-
surance industry attempted to fault law-
yers, jurors or injured victims for this 
"crisis." 
However, a more objective analysis indi-
cates that the "crisis" resulted from poor 
management practices by the insurance in-
dustry. Insurance carriers have essentially 
two streams of income from which to pay 
claims and record a profit: 1) the premium 
dollars that policyholders pay to purchase 
insurance coverage; and 2) investment in-
come which is earned on funds that are re-
ceived and not utilized to pay claims. Ac-
cordingly, when interest rates are high 
(such as they were in the early 1980's) the 
insurance industry attempts to attract as 
many policyholders as possible to increase 
the number of premium dollars received. 
In order to attract additional funds, the in-
dustry cuts premiums to sell as many poli-
cies as possible. After receipt of these funds, 
the carriers invest the money to obtain the 
highest return on investment, resulting in 
large profits. 
On the other hand, when interest rates 
fall to reasonable levels (as they did in the 
mid 1980's), the amount of the investment 
income earned by the insurance carriers 
drops dramatically. The industry then at-
tempts to maintain billion dollar profits by 
increasing premiums. 
Clearly this increase in policy premiums 
has nothing to do with the amount ofjudg-
ments awarded or the number of cases 
filed. Rather, the insurance companies 
increase premiums in an effort to maintain 
profit margins and recoup lost income due 
to falling interest rates and poor business 
practices. 5 
Furthermore, the insurance industry 
falsely appears to lose money while reap-
ing large profits. This is accomplished by 
inflating estimated future claims and pay-
outs, while setting aside large "loss re-
serves" to cover these hypothetical future 
losses. Incredibly, the insurance companies 
invest these reserves and earn continuing 
investment income while claiming them as 
tax losses. That is how the property/cas-
ualty insurance industry made a 75 billion 
dollar profit between 1975 and 1984, but 
showed a paper loss, and avoided the pay-
ment of income taxes. 6 
Because of such accounting practices, 
property/casualty insurance industry's 
stock prices have increased over seventy 
percent (70%) between January 1, 1984 
and June 30, 1986, and the net worth of 
liability insurance companies have more 
than quadrupled, from 20 billion dollars to 
over 91 billion dollars.8 Further, in 1986, 
the industry'S net worth increased by over 
21 billion dollars. 9 Indeed, between 1975 
and 1985, the property/casualty insurance 
companies in Maryland charged more 
than 18.2 billion dollars in premiums (ex-
cluding any investment income) but paid 
out only 10.02 billion dollars in losses. 10 
Unsatisfied with increased assets of7.6 
billion dollars in 1985 II and a profit 0" 
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11.5 billion dollars in 1986,12 the industry 
elected to engage in a coordinated campaign 
to press for "tort reform" notwithstanding 
estimated profits of90 billion dollars in the 
next four years. 13 The industry's version 
of reform is to limit the rights of catastroph-
ically injured victims in suing and recover-
ing damages to which they are entitled. By 
withdrawing from some markets and rais-
ing premiums drastically in others, the in-
surers continue to attempt to curtail the 
rights of those injured through negligence. 
The chief executive officer of Geico In-
surance Company best explained the in-
surers' strategy in 1985: "It is right for the 
industry to withdraw from the insurance 
market and let the pressures for reform 
build in the state legislatures." 14 . 
Thus, a 6.5 million dollar national ad-
vertising campaign was launched ·to create 
the perception of a "lawsuit crisis" with an 
emphasis on medical negligence cases. 15 
Industry leaders, supported by medical in-
terests, attempted to argue that judgments 
and settlements were extraordinaril¥ high. 
In fact, the opposite is true. There is no 
runaway judgment or award problem in 
Maryland. Between 1980 and 1984, Med-
ical Mutual (the insurance carrier which 
insures the majority of Maryland doctors) 
received approximately 152 million dol-
lars in premiums and investment income. 
However, the company only paid out ap-
proximately 37 million dollars during tg.!lt 
same time period. 16 Moreover, malprac-
tice premiums in Maryland make up less 
than 1 % of the total cost of delivering 
health care to the public. 17 What becomes 
painfully clear is that Maryland citizens 
have not abused their right to be adequately 
compensated when injured through the neg-
ligence of a physician or another defendant. 
Nevertheless, the new cap discriminates 
against plaintiffs who have suffered devas-
tating injuries at the hands of negligent 
defendants by arbitrarily limiting their re-
coveries regardless of the circumstances of 
the case. Such legislation supplants the 
role of the jury or panel in determining the 
extent and nature of damages to be awarded 
in a particular case. 18 
Tragically, it is essentially admitted that 
the cap will not significantly reduce pre-
miums charged by the insurance industry. 
Indeed, within thirty days of the time, 
former Governor Hughes signed the cap 
into law, Medical Mutual requested and 
was granted a 500/0 rate increase in pre-
miums. 19 It is obvious that the insurance 
interests cannot square this conduct with 
the legislation passed. Further, in Florida 
where similar restrictions were passed, 
two major insurance carriers, Aetna and 
St. Paul Fire and Marine, filed data with 
the Insurance Commissioner indicating 
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that the "tort reform" legislation would 
have essentially no impact on premiums 
charged for insurance. St. Paul concluded 
that" ... our best estimate is no effect from 
the tort changes." 20 
The proper remedy for the industry's 
self-created "crisis" is legislation to require 
the disclosure of the accounting practices, 
reserves, true profits and other data with 
which to properly regulate the industry. 
Clearly, the insurance carriers should be 
held accountable to make premiums charged 
various policyholders commensurate with 
legitimate claims and true liability incurred 
-not paper liabilities designed to retain 
funds and maximize billion dollar profits 
in the industry. 
"the newly created 
cap will penalize 
persons whose lives 
have already been 
shattered through 
the negligence 
of others" 
Highlights of Changes Made in 
Health Claims Arbitration 
Health Claims Arbitration involves the 
vast majority of medical negligence cases 
in which the negligence occurred on or 
after July 1, 1976. 21 Each case is heard be-
fore a panel comprised of three persons: a 
lawyer acting as a chairperson, a health care 
provider and a layman. A verdict is obtained 
by an affirmative vote of two of the three 
panel members, who not only determine 
liability but also assess damages. If any 
party is aggrieved by the results of the arbi-
tration, an appeal may be taken to the ap-
propriate circuit court with proper venue. 22 
On appeal, the proceedings are "de novo" 
but with a "presumption of correctness." 23 
In essence, the presumption amounts to an 
instruction to the jury indicating that the 
decision of the arbitration panel is "pre-
sumed correct." This is a rebuttable pre-
sumption which the jury may accept or re-
ject based upon the evidence presented. 24 
In addition to creating the cap, the legis-
lature altered Health Claims Arbitration in 
six major areas. First, on or after July 1, 
1986, a claimant or plaintiff is required to 
file a certificate of a qualified expert, indi-
cating that there is a violation of the stan-
dards of care and that the departure from 
the standards of care caused the alleged in-
jury. This report or "certificate of merit" 
must be filed within ninety days of the 
date the claimant files a claim with the 
Health Claims Arbitration Office. Failure 
to do so will result in the claim being dis-
missed, without prejudice.25 Obviously, 
this provision is intended to weed out 
frivolous cases. 
Second, a health care provider defen-
dant is required to file a certificate of a qual-
ified expert attesting to compliance with 
the standards of care or that any violation 
of the standards of care did not proximately 
cause the alleged injury. This certificate 
must be filed within 120 days after the 
claimant files the initial certificate. Failure 
to file the certificate will result in an ad-
judication in favor of the claimant on the 
issue ofliability.26 As with the certificate 
of merit, the defendant's certificate is in-
tended to identify cases which should not 
be defended. 
Third, the legislature placed a limita-
tion on the attesting expert witness who 
prepares a certificate of merit or meritori-
ous defense, requiring that he or she may 
not " ... devote annually more than 200/0 of 
the expert's professional activities to activ-
ities that directly involve testimony in per-
sonal injury claims." 27 This requirement 
will have a "chilling effect" on any expert's 
willingness to prepare a certificate because 
of probable attempts to scrutinize the fi-
nancial affairs of such an expert. Interest-
ingly experts testifying at trial are not lim-
ited to this 200/0 rule. 28 
Fourth, the new law limits testimony in 
any arbitration proceeding to two experts 
in a "designated specialty" unless the panel 
chairman determines that good cause is 
shown for additional expert testimony.29 
Essentially, this provision further limits 
the ability of the claimant, who has the 
burden of proof throughout the course of 
the proceedings, to make a full, fair and 
adequate presentation of the evidence in-
volved. There is no reason for an arbitrary 
limitation of two experts in any field. In 
cases of significant injuries, complex med-
ical issues or those involving the overlap 
of medical fields or sub-specialties, the 
parties should be permitted to present as 
much expert testimony as necessary to 
prove or defend their cases. 
Fifth, the new law permits authenticated 
hospital records and records of treating 
health care providers to be admitted at the 
arbitration proceedings without any custo-
dian or other witness sponsoring them, 
subject to the opposing party's right to 
take a deposition. 3D This is ostensibly de-
signed to "expedite" the arbitration pro-
ceedings by eliminating the necessity for 
testimony by a custodian of records. 
Sixth, the new law incorporates all Mary-
land Rules of Procedure into Health Claims 
Arbitration. 31 Additionally, if an arbitra-
tion panel finds "that the conduct of any 
party in maintaining or defending any ac-
tion is in bad faith or without substantial 
justification" the panel may order the of-
fending party, his counsel, or both to pay 
costs plus reasonable expenses including 
attorney's fees. 32 
Conclusion 
As is patently clear, the newly created cap 
will penalize persons whose lives have al-
ready been shattered through the negligence 
of others without significantly reducing in-
surance premiums. The legislation simply 
represents the erosion of plaintiffs' rights 
across the State of Maryland for adequate, 
fair and complete compensation for in-
juries sustained as a result of proven negli-
gence on the part of health care providers 
and other defendants. The legislation, as it 
exists, should be repealed or declared un-
constitutional, with legislation passed to 
permit full scrutiny and regulation of the 
insurance industry. 
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